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　　　　　In　the　preceding　sub－section　I　considered　the　last　chapter，
Pt．　V，　Ch．　II，　of　Whitehead’sProce∬and　Reality　from　my　own
perspective　of　analogy．　But，　as　I　said　earlier，　there　is　another
way　of　studying　the　chapter；that　is　to　understand　it　in　the
light　of　the　whole　development　of　his　cosmology　in　the　preceding
chapters　of　the　book　and　in　other　important　works　written　by
him　prior　to　the　book．　Although　I　occasionally　referred，　in　my
analogical　consideration　of　the　chapter，　to　some　important
passages　as　found　there　in，　it　is　the　task　of　the　present　sub－section
to　understand　it　in　the　light　of　Whitehead’scosmology　developed
in　the　works　prior　to　it．
　　　　　If　my　understanding　is　correct，　one　of　the　most　important
issues　in　these　works，　including．4n　Enquiry　Concerning　the
PrinciPles　oアノ〉αtzaral　、Knowledge　（1919），　7「he　ConcePt　o∫Nature
（1920），　The　P7imil）le　of　1～616z々初゜ty　（1922），　Sy〃zbolis〃z！　lts　Meaning
and　Effects　（1927），　and　the　preceding　chapters　of　Proce∬and
Reality，　is　the　issue　of“significance”which　climaxes　in　the
notiOn　of“symbolic　referenCe．”68a　According　to　Whitehead，
The　human　mind　is　functioning　symbolically　when　some
components　of　its　experience　elicit　consciousness，　beliefs，
2emotions　，　and　usages，　respecting　other　components　of　its
experience．　The　former　set　of　components　are　the‘symbols，’
and　the　latter　set　constitute　the‘meaning’of　the　symbols．
The　organic　functioning　whereby　there　is　transition　from
the　symbol　to　meaning　will　be　called‘symbolic　reference，’69
　　　　　　Whitehead’suse　of“symbo1”here　reminds　me　of　Aquinas’
notion　of　the　modus　significandi（mode　of　signification）；and　his
use　of“meaning，”of　the　perfectio　significata（pe㎡ection　signified）．
However，　it　should　be　remembered　that　Whitehead’smajor
focus　is　now　put　upon　the　problem　of　perception，　not　upon　the
analogical　transferability　of　human　language　to　the　realm　of　the
Divine，　as　in　Aquinas，　Yet，　it　is　clear　that　he　is　concerned
with　some　function　of　transference．
　　　　　For　instance，　Whitehead　speaks　of　the　problem　of　transference
in　reference　to“symbolically　conditioned　action”as　follows：
“Symbolically　conditioned　action　is　action　which　is　thus　conditioned
by　the　analysis　of　the　perceptive　mode　of　causal　efficacy　effected
by　symbolic　transference　from　the　perceptive　mode　of　presentational
immediacy”（S，80）．That　is　to　say，　one　refers　back　to　the
perceptive　mode　of　causal　efficacy　analytically　or　intellectually
only　because　one　is　at　the　same　time　symbolically　encouraged　to
do　so　by　the　perceptive　mode　of　presentational　immediacy．
　　　　　　What　I　think　is　peculiar　in　this　case　is　the　fact　that　the
function　of　transference　is　taking　place　in　the　manner　of　retrieval，
although，　as　Whitehead　affirms，　on　the　other　hand，　it　is　inherent
in　the　process　of　the　universe　that“the　causal　efficacy　from　the
past　is　at　least　one　factor　giving　our　presentational　immediacy　in
the　present”and　that“The　how　of　our　present　experience　must
conform　to　the　what　of　the　past　in　us”（S，58）．This　paradoxical
state　of　affairs（which　comes　to　the　fore　in　tems　of　the　symbolical
transference　between　the　two　perceptive　modes）is　strongly
reminiscent　of　our　threefold　articulation　of　the　problem　of
theological　analogy　in　the　preceding　sub－section　in　terms　of　our
ultimate　metaphysical　visions　of　reality　as　A［1］，　B，　and　A［2］．
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As　I　said　there，　vision　of　reality　A［2］is　attitudinal，　in　the
sense　that　it　re－enacts　in　creaturely－human　terms　what　was
already　there　in　vision　of　reality　A［1］ontologically．　ln　this
connection，　we　need　to　notice　that　the　problem　of　perception
has　a　significant　metaphysical　repercussion　in　our　construction
of　the　visions　of　reality　in　some　way　or　another．
　　　　　Then，　here　arises　a卿s’競’How　or　under　what　contition　is
“S遡60〃Creference”in　hu〃zanカθ7C召ρ’肋corresPondent’0伽’αS々0ア
theological朋α109ツ～7°To　answer　this　question　properly，　it　is
important　to　note　with　Whitehead　that“．．．symbolic　reference
must　be　explained　antecedently　to　conceptual　analysis，　although
there　is　a　strong　interplay　between　the　two　whereby　they
promote　each　other”（S，19）．The　problem　is　this：symbolical
reference　must　be　explained　antecedently　to　conceptual　analysis－and
yet　this　from　the　viewpoint　of　conceptual　analysis　or　reflection：
that　is，　after　symbolical　reference　has　occurred．　How　is　this
problem　to　be　solved？In　my　opinion，　Hartshorne　wants　to
solve　it　by　his　doctrine　of　the　mind－body　analogy　based　upon
the　processive，　temporal　modality　of　existence　he　espouses　with
Whitehead．　Then，　let　me　scrutinize　his　analogical　argument　to
know　whether　it　is　convincing　or　not，　and　if　so，　how．
　　　　　1．Hartshome　and　Langer　Hartshorne’senthusiasm　for　the
theological　analogy　in　correspondence　with　Whitehead’sdoctrine
of“symbolic　reference”can　be　illustrated　by　comparison　with
Susanne　Langer’sinterest　in　non－discursive　symbolism　based
upon　the　same　doctrine．　To　refer　to　Whitehead’sdefinition　of　it
again，　symbolic　reference　is“the　elucidation　of　percepta　in　the
mode　of　causal　efficacy　by　the　fluctuating　intervention　of　percepta
in　the　mode　of　presentational　immediacy”（PR，178）．Langer　is
interested　in　the　mode　of　presentational　immediacy　because　it
provides　her　a　key　to　an　“unexplored　possibility　of　genuine
semantic　beyond　the　limits　of　discursive　language．”71
　　　　　However，　in　her　pursuit　of　symbolic　semantics，　Langer
has　lost　sight，　on　the　other　hand，　of　the　importance　of　metaphysics．
4This　was　probably　because　she　might　have　given　full　assent　to
what　Hartshorne　regards　as　Wittgenstein’scriticism　of　metaphysics
for“giving　pseudo－answers　to　pseudo－questions，　on　the　ground
that　in　metaphysics　we　are　attributing　to　the　world　what　really
belongs　to　our　logical　projection．”720f　course，　Langer　does　not
relegate　the　study　of　the　logical“beyond”（which　Wittgenstein
calls　the“unspeakable，”both　Russell　and　Carnap　regard　as　the
sphere　of　subjective　experience，　emotion，　feeling，　and　wish）to
psychology，　as　do　Wittgenstein　and　his　followers（PNK，86）．
Yet，　she　nonetheless　declares　that“in　this　physical，　space－time
world　of　our　experience　there　are　things　which　do　not　fit　the
grammatical　scheme　of　expression，”including，　presumably，
metaphysics．（PNK，88）For　Hartshorne，　on　the　contrary，
linguistic　modality　is　derivative　from　metaphysical　modality　as　a
temporal　process（CSPM，133）．And　the　temporal　process
involves　perception．　If　so，　the　metaphysical　problem　of　analogy
can　also　be　seen　as　perceptively　well－grounded．
　　　　　　2．　Hartshorne　and　Emmet　Hartshorne’s　orientation　of
theological　analogy　is　significantly　different　from　Dorothy　Emmet’s，
another　Whiteheadian　metaphysician　who　is　also　interested　in
the　combination　of“symbolic　reference”and　analogy．　Hartshorne
includes　in　his　idea　of　analogy　literal　theism．　By　contrast，
Emmet　conceives　of　analogy　in　terms　of“some　important　character
or　thread　of　co－ordination”found　in　the　whole　manifold　of
experience．73　That　is　to　say，　she　does　not　pin　down　the　problem
of　analogy　in　a　clear－cut　theistic　manner　like　Hartshorne　does．
　　　　　One　of　the　reasons　for　this　might　be　the　fact　that　Emmet
disregards　Whitehead’snotion　of‘‘causal　efficacy，”whereas
Hartshorne　prizes　it．　Emmet　replaces　Whitehead’scausal　efficacy
with　what　she　calls　the“adverbial”mode　of　perception－一“a
responsive　state　of　the　organism　in　rapport　with，　or　receiving
shocks　from　its　environment”（NMT，61）．She　also　replaces
Whitehead’spresentational　immediacy　with　her　own　notion　of
the“accusative”mode　of　perception，』翌?奄モ?@is“a　differentiation
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of　contents　of　awareness”（NMT，42）．This　is　precisely　because
she　disagrees　with　Whitehead’sepistemology，　the　method　of
extending　the　categories　drawn　from　organic（i．e．，pre－conscious）
analogies　upwards　and　downwards，　that　is，　to　the　worlds　of
conscious　thought　and　of　the　inorganic．　As　a　result，　for　her，
“knolwledge　is　only　possible　where　there　is　some　actual　situation
of　relatedness　together　with　conscious　awareness　of　relationship”
（NMT，66）．
　　　　　　Thus，　Emmet’sepistemology　is　subjectivistic，　in　the
sense　that　she　presupposes　some　function　of　consciousness，　as
the　accusative　mode　of　perception，　between　the　adverbial　mode，
as　the　internalized　form　of　sense　objects，　and　Whitehead’s
presentational　immediacy，　as　the　projection　of　the　internalized
sense　objects　on　to　a　region　of　the　contemporary　world．　The
reason　why　she　needs　consciousness　here　in　opposition　to
Whitehead’s（and　Heidegger’s）“vague”description　of　the　basic
stage　of　experience　（as，　for　instance，　‘‘prehension”　or　‘‘care”）
is，　in　my　view，　that　she　fails　to　see　the　fact　that　for　Whitehead
causal　efficacy　is　alreaめノincarnate　in　the　experience　here－now
（specifically　under　its　primary，　dative　phase）insofar　as　it　is
found　to　be　intersecting　presentational　immediacy．　That　is　to
say，　she　does　not　recognize　the　direCt（in　the　sense　of　pre－℃onscious）
intersection　of　Whitehead’stwo　modes　of　perception　in　the
experience－the　intersection　which　gives　rise　to　symbolism．
　　　　　3．」Uartshome’s、1（fethod　oアAnalogy　The　intent　of　the　above
remarks　is　to　point　out：Hartshome’s　method　oアanelogy　cosists　in
the　fact　that　he　takes翻O　seriOUS　consideration　both　metαPhysiCS
（i脚1翻9〃teral伽ゴS〃Z／and　Cα％Sα1　efficacy　in　his　CO励伽’競0∫
sツ〃zbolic　re／cerence　and　the　task　oアtheological　analogy．　In　fact，　literal
theism　and　causal　efficacy（in　the　sense　of　causal　unification　or
bond）are　conterminous：together　they　constitute　the　univocal
element　in　his　method　of　analogy．　This　is　because　for　him　the
modality　of　signification　is　essentially　temporal，　then　time，
hence　modality，　is　not　an　intra－linguistic　phenomenon．　And
6because　God－now　is　for　him　the　al1－inclusive　reality，　any
assertions　whatever　can，　without　loss，　be　translated　into　an
assertion　about　God（CSPM，149）．
　　　　　Significantly　enough，　this　is　the　same　truth　as　we　designated
　　　　　　　　　　　　　ゆ　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ゆ
earlier　as　WG．　In　my　reality－picture（see　Fig．　II），　WG　is
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ゆ　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ゆ
contingent　upon　CW（Concrescence）and　intersects㏄（Primordial
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ゆ　　　　　　　コ　ゆ　　　　　　　ゆ
Exemplification）．That　is　to　say，　CW十WG＝CG．　In　this
　　N　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ロ　　ゆ
equation，（1）CW　signifies　whatever　happens　in　the　World　by
virtue　of　the　ultimate　metaphysical　reality／principle　of　Creativity；
　　　　の（2）WG　signifies　God　as　God　absorbs　into　the　bosom　of　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　のdeity　all　the　Worldly　processes；and（3）㏄signifies　the　Primordial
Nature　of　God，1御the“acquirement　of　Creativity　of　a　primordial
character”（PR，344），　as　it　integrates　into　itself　the　Consequent
Nature　of　God　in　order　for　the　entire　God　to“be　fundamentally
with　us　creatures”under　the　primary，　dative　phase　of　the
nascent　creation－－the　phase　which　Whitehead　calls“natural
potentiality”@（S，36，50）　or　‘‘the　stubborn　fact”　（S，37）．　Our
present　formula，　in　my　view，　very　much　fits　in　with　Hartshome’s
method　of　analogy，　the　mind－body　analogy　referring　to　the
all－embracing　love　of　God（which　Hartshorne　considers　under
the　heading　of“panentheism”），　if　point　3　above　is　acceptable　at
all　to　him．74
　　　　　When　it　comes　to　the　analogical　predication　of　God，　we
are　dealing　with　linguistic　modality，　which　is　derivative　from
temporal　or　ontological　modality．　On　this　level，　Hartshorne
distinguishes　the　category　of　analogical　signification　from　two
other　categories，　symbolism　and　literalism．　For　him，　symbolical
terms　are　usable　only　in　reference　to　quite　specific　sorts　of
things，　such　as“shepherd，”“ruler，”and“potter．”And　literal
terms　like“relative”and‘‘absolute”make　sense　only　in　metaphysics．
But　analogical　terms　like“㎞ow”or“love”belong　to　the　problematic
class　of　theological　concepts（CSPM，155）．That　is　to　say，　for
him　the　analogical　category　of　signification，　which　is　neither
unambiguously　literal　nor　unambiguously　non－1iteral，　is　a　bridge
area　between　metaphysics　and　theology　as　the　science　of　revelation
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（e．g．，Luther’smetaphorical　analogy　we　studied　in　Section　II）．
　　　　　Now　Hartshorne　begins　his　discussion　of　the　mind－body
analogy　by　an　appreciation　of　the　Thomistic　idea　of鋭o伽s
Stgnificancii　with　these　words：
The　relation　of　God　to　the　world　must　necessarily　be
conceived，　if　at　all，　by　analogy　with　relations　given　in
human　experience．　To　reject　such　analogies　completely
would　be　to　adopt　a　wholly“negative”or　empty　theology，
besides　contradicting　the　basic　religious　doctrine　that　man
is　the　image　of　God．　Accordingly，　a　principal　task　of　any
theology　is　to　examine　the　relations　in　which　things　stand
in　our　experience　in　order　to　discover　the　direction　in
which　the　indeed　superior，　but　not　in　every　sense　incom－
parable，　relations　of　God　are　to　be　sought．75
　　　　　Hartshorne　finds　the　most　reliable　sense　of　such　analogies
in　the　relations　between　human　beings　and　creatures　inferior　to
them，　in　view　of　the　fact　that　what　is　prerequisite　to　the
theological　analogy　is　the　notion　of“whole．”“Our　relation　to
the　sub－human，”he　says，“to　bear　much　analogy　to　the　relation
of　God　to　the　world，　must　be　a　relation　to　a　whole　of　things
all　of　which　are　radically　inferior　to　us，　and　in　which　whole　we
may　be　said　to　be　something　like　omnipresent　or　immanent”
（MVG，175）．For　him　one　and　only　such　whole　is　the　human
body．
　　　　　It　may　be　noted，　however，　that　Hartshorne　regards　the
seeming　solidarity　of　the　body　as　an　exaggeration　of　sense
perception　because　perception　is　on　the　macroscopic　scale，　while
the　real　individuals　in　the　body　are　microscopic（MVG，176）．　If
we　infer，　from　the　fact　that　no　organism　contains　individual
parts　which　as　such　are　clearly‘‘perceptible，”that　organisms
probably　or　certainly　contain　no　individual　parts，　we　would　be
doomed　to　make　a　pure　philosophic　error．　For　the　premise　of
the　inference，　as　Hartshorne　critically　assumes，　is　that　what
8does　not　appear　distinctively　to　the　human　senses　probably　or
certainly　does　not　exist（MVG，177）．　Radically　different　from
Emmet’ssubjectivism　mentioned　earlier，　Hartshorne　holds　that
there　is　something　in　the　body　which　is　hidden　from　us－the
position　in　line　with　what　Whitehead　calls“the　closure　of
nature　to　mind．”76　This　something　involves　a　multiplicity　of
invisible　parts，　that　is，　of　parts　which　cannot　nevertheless　be
thought　lacking　in　real　individuality．
　　　　　Thus，　if　the　body　is　really　a“world”of　individuals，　then
amind，　if　the　body　is　one　having　a　mind（or　one　capable　of
thinking　and　feeling），is　to　that　body　something　like　an　indwelling
God（MVG，177）．And　because　the　immediate　object　of　effective
human　control　or　volition　is　a　change　in　the　human　body，　the
power－relation，　qua　the　mind－body　relation，　can　be　used　as　the
basis　for　the　theological　analogy（MVG，179）．　It　is　from　this
perspective　that　Hartshorne　poses　three　statements，　the　former
one　referring　to　the　analogatum（i．e．，humanity）and　the　latter
ones　to　analogans（i．e．，God），　as　follows：
［1］．．．the　body　as　a　whole　as　a　dynamic　individual　unit
（not　a　collecion）or－－it　is　the　same　thing－－as　a　mind，
wills：the　parts　of　the　body（which　may　be　minds，　but
not　that　mind）respond．（MVG，182）．
［2］＿if　God　be　complete　there　must　be　something　in　him
which　is　simple　and　always　the　same，　and　this　is　fully
provided　for　by　the　A［i．e．，Absolute］factor　in　the　AR
［i．e．，Absolute　and　Relative］doctrine．（MVG，182）
［3］．．．God　has　no　separate　sense　organs　or　muscles
because　all　parts　of　the　world　body　directly　perform
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　りfunction　for　him．　In　this　sense　the　world　is　God　s　body．
（MVG，185）
To　sum　up，　what　Hartshorne　is　proposing　in　terms　of　his
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doctrine　of　the　mind－body　analogy，　in　my　own　view，　is　something
like　the　following　formula：
　　　　　human　mind　　　　　　Divine　Mind　as　A
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　：　　：
　　　　　human　body　　　　The　World　as　Divine　Body　or　R．
In　maintaining　the　bond　in　the　proportionality　the　fourth　term
is　given　to　us　prior　to　the　analogy　in　the　sense　of　linguistic
modality（see　the　above　statement　3　and　our　afore－mentioned
りWG）．　However，　the　fourth　term　is　correlated　with　the　third
term　in　the　entire　reality　of　God（see　the　above　statement　2　and
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　のour　afore－mentioned　CG）．Otherwise，　there　cannot　exist　the
organic　proportionality　of　the　Divine　relation（consisting　in　the
third　and　fourth　terms）to　the　human　relation（consisting　in
the　first　and　second　terms，　as　mentioned　in　the　above　statement
1）．
　　　　　Further，　with　regard　to　the　actual　relation　between　the
second　and　third　terms，　namely，“human　body”and“Divine
Mind　as　A，”it　is　crucial，　to　my　mind，　that　we　conceive　of　the
latter（God）as　already　being　with　the　former（creature）under
the　primary，　dative　phase　of　the　nascent　self－creation　by　us．　It
is　precisely　at　this　juncture　that　I　approve（although　in　a　way
transformatively）of　Whitehead’smaxim　to　the　effect　that　in　the
primordial　aspect　of　the　deity　God　is“not　be／bre　all　creation，
but　with　all　creation”（PR，343）．76a　However，　Hartshorne’s
analogical　argument　doesn’tfully　articulate　this　point，　although
it　is　convincingly　based　upon　the　fourth　term（The　World　as
Divine　Body　or　R）in　terms　of　his　own　unique　reinterpretation
of　Whitehead’snotion　of　the　Consequent　Nature　of　God．
　　　　　My　concern　here，　accordingly，　is　with　articulating　the
problem　of　how　God　is　fundamentally“with　us”一一under　the
primary，　dative　phase　of　the　nascent　creation－even　befcre　the　A
element　of　the　deity（i．e．，Divine　Mind）impinges　upon　us
evocatively．　By　contrast，　Harthorne’sliteralism（which　constitutes
the　essential　part　of　his　analogical　argument）is　an　attempt　at
knowing　how　God　is“together　with　us　creatures”after　the
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worldly　process　of　concrescence　has　come　to　an　end．　For　this
reason　it　is　inseparably　combined　with　the　perspective　of　God’s
eVerlaSting　memOry．
　　　　　　It　is　my　contention，　then，　that　in　accounting　for　the
entire　scope　of　temporal　modality　both　perspectives　can　assist
and　supplement　each　other　into　mutual　enrichment．　For　after
the　completion　of　the　present　concrescence　there　always　arises
the　period　of　understanding－≠）lus－preparation　before　the　next
concrescence　gets　started－－indeed，　repeatedly　anew　in　the
creative　advance　of　the　universe．　And　this　is　the　only　reason
why　the　analytical　or　intellectual　retrieval　of　meaning（qua
causal　efficacy）by　way　of“symbolic　reference，”mentioned
earlier，　is　possible　even　after　symbols　are　given　before　our　eyes
presentationally　immediately．　It　must　also　be　in　this　sense　that
Paul　Ricoeur　is　right　metaphysically，　as　well　as　theologically，
when　he　claims　in　The　Symbolism　o∫Eぬ1　that“Symbols　give　rise
to　thought．”76b
　　　　　Section　IV：Concluding　Remarks
　　　　　In　any　field　of　science　it　is　of　utmost　importance　what
kind　of　question　one　wants　to　answer．　In　my　case，　I　have
found　in　the　Thomistic　analogy　of　attributon　duontm　ad　tertizam
one　of　the　most　crucial　questions　in　the　history　of　systematic
theology　or　philosophy　of　religion．　That　is　the　question：Why
or　on　what　basis　does　Thomas　Aquinas　discard　this　type　of
analogy？　Obviously，　as　I　articulated　in　Section　I，　one　of　the
reasons　is　that　he　lacks　the　knowledges　of　the　dipolar　nature　of
God　and　of　the　distinction　between　God　and　the　metaphysical
ultimate，　Being．　And　this　shows　an　essential　characteristic　of
traditional　type　natural　theology．
　　　　　　In　the　course　of　the　development　of　theology　in　the
Christian　West，　however，　this　characteristic　has　been　broken
through　at　least　in　two　cases：Luther’svision　of　the　deity　as
dual　and　Whitehead’sdifferentiation　of　the　ultimate　metaphysical
principle　of　creativity　from　God．　As　elucidated　in　Sections　II
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and　III，　each　case，　though　unwittingly，　provides　an　ontological
guarantee　of　the　analogy　in　question．　I　find　in　Luther’sdoctrine
of　justification　and　prayer　a　theistic　or　Christological　vindication
of　the　analogy　in　terms　of　justice－language　and　in　Whitehead’s
consideration　of　God　and　the　world　a　metaphysical　vindication
of　it　in　terms　of　creativity－1anguage．
　　　　　Hence，　there　arise　two　kinds　of“authentic　existence”：
one　is　authentic　by　being　‘‘righteous　by　faith　alone”　and　the
other　by　being‘‘creative．”　（If　I　can　add　here　the　case　of　Buddhist
Emptiness　in　the　sense　of　Emptiness　emptying　itself，　thereby
being　‘‘selnessly　creative，　　the　authenticity　of　creativity－language
in　reference　to　human　existence　is　guaranteed　more　fully．）At
any　rate，　these　two　types　of　existence　are　both　authentic　in
their　own　unique　ways．　They　are　incommensurable；and　yet
they　are　authentic　in　a　complementary　fashion　because　they
require　each　other　for　the　sake　of　the　wholeness　of　humanity　in
aglobal　age，　such　as　ours．　One　can　argue，　for　instace，　that　if
we　were“窒奄№?狽?盾浮刀hwithout　being“creative，”we　would　be
doomed　to　be　narrow－minded　and　powerless．　Conversely，　if　we
were“モ窒?≠狽奄魔?honly　without　being　concerned　to　be“righteous，”
then　we　would　be　lacking　in　our　actual　lives　a　focus　of　our
abundant　energy，　hence，　aimless　and　wasteful．
　　　　　From　my　perspective　of　analogy，　it　is　within　the　framework
of　Luther’ssymbolical　theology　that　Barth’sAnalogia　Fidei　cztm
Analogia　Relationis　and　Pannenberg’sdoxological　analogy　have
articulated　the　theological　structure　of　Protestantism：it　is
dialectical　but　fails　to　deal　with　the　Thomistic　question　of　how
God，　Being，　and　beings　are　related　to　each　other．　It　is　within
the　framework　of　Whitehead’smetaphysics　that　an　articulate
answer　is　given　to　this　question，　while　at　the　same　time　taking
seriously　the　dialectical　view　of　God（see　Hartshorne’sdipolar
theism）．7⊃肋s，　it　is〃zy　contention　that　zuader’勿aspaCt　o∫α陥’tehea（lian
m’獅モ撃奄モ≠狽奄盾氏@of　the　analogッthere　isαhigher　synthesis　OアReveαled　and
ハlatural　7「heologi’es．77　This　synthesis　contains　four　elements　or
dimensions：（1）topology；（2）the　analogy　of　being；（3）the
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initiation　of　aims；and（4）the　fulfillment　of　aims．　Let　me
explain　each　of　them　as　follows：
1．Topalogy（rzル伽帥卿cs　oアCreat　iza’tN　：7劾MetaPhyStcα1　Reintcrptetation
o∫伽Analogy　oアAttribzetion　duorum　ad　tertium
　　　　　On　the　ultimate　metaphysical　level，　reality　is　that　under
which　God　and　the　World　are　both　subsumed；as　such，　it　is
the　topos　where　God　and　the　World　are　ultimately　located．　As
Nishida　insightfully　states，　God　and　the　World　are　one　by
virtue　of　the　principle　of“unity　of　opposites．”To　use　Whitehead’s
phraseology，　God　and　the　World　are　both　in　the　grip　of　Creativity．
Analogically，　this　means　that　the　analogy　of　attribution　duomm
ad　tertium　is　of　avail　in　metaphysics．　Thus，　authentic　existence
in　this　regard　is　one　which　is“creative”on　its　own　while　at
the　same　time　correspondent　to　this　metaphysical　picture，　as
mentioned　earlier．
　　　　　It　should　be　noted　that　part　of　this　reality－picture　is　the
theistic　fact　that　in　God　the　primordial　nature（which　is　the
primordial　character　of　Creativity）and　the　consequent　nature
（which　is　contingent　upon　the　concrescence　of　particulars　in
the　world　which　happens　by　virtue　of　Creativity）are　creatively
unified．　Contrary　to　the　Thomistic　view，　in　God　essence　and
existence　are　not　merely　identical　but　rather　form　the　theistic
case　of　unity　of　opposites．　Recall　here　our　formulation　as
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ゆ　　　　　　　コロゆregards　Hartshorne’sdoctrine　of　organic　analogy：CW十WG＝
露．
2．Analogical　ExemP〃fi　cation　：Analogi’αE纏s　in　the　Sense　oア伽
肋α10gy　oアProPer　ProPortionality
　　　　　If　the　first　truth　is　acknowledged，　we　need　not　object　to
the　Thomistic　analogy　of　proper　proportionality　which　is　based
upon　the　analogical　exemplification　of　Being（Lat．，e∬のin　both
God　and　particulars．　For，　while，　topologically－ontologically，
God　and　particulars　are　in　the　grip　of　Being，　proportionately－
ontologically，　they　exemplify　it　in　themselves．　Each　being　has，
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accordingly，　its　own　portion　or　right（Lat．，suum　cztiqzee）in　the
universe－God　maximally　and　particulars　in　their　respectively
limited　ways．　This　is　important　in　that　it　lays　foundation　for
the　notion　of　justice　because　justice　is　‘‘to　render　to　each
person　his　or　her　due．”Accordingly，　authentic　existence　in　this
regard　is　one　which　is“just”in　accordance　with　the　proportion－
ate－analogical　structure　of　ontology．
　　　　　Acritical　revision　of　the　Thomist　concept　of　being　is
imperative　from　the　Whiteheadian　perspective，　though．　Beings
must　be　considered　not　in　individualistic　but　in　unificatory
terms．　That　is，　beings　are　the　creative　unifications　here－now　of
the　universe．　And　Being　is　the　principle　of　creative　unification
or　creativity．　It　follows　that　one’sown　portion　or　right　is　not
an　individualistic　but　unificatory　actuality．
3．The／nitiation　oア／1ims！The．Analogy　oアAttribution　unius　ad
alterum
　　　　　When　it　comes　to　the　ontological－axiological　dimension　of
the　universe，　the　former　two　truths　give　way　to　the　third
truth：the　initiation　of　aims　in　particulars　by　God　as　God　is
primordial　in　terms　of　the　analogy　of　attribution　unius　ad　altemm．
Here　we　may　say，　with　Thomists，　that　beings　are“effects－imply－
ing－cause．”@But　this　is　true　only　insofar　as　beings　respond　to
the　ordering　will　of　God　which　impinges　upon　their　own　respective
modes　of　being，　saying：“Accomplish　your　duties　given　to　you
proportionately－ontologically　according　to　your　portions　in　the
universe　while　at　the　same　time　giving　to　every　one　other　than
yourselves　his　or　her　due．”
　　　　　As　is　implicit　in　this　phraseology，　the　analogy　at　issue
presupposes　the　working　of　the　analogy　of　proper　proportionality，
our　second　truth．　In　this　respect，　I　agree　with　James　F．　Anderson
that　the　analogy　of　attribution　is　only“virtua1．”According　to
him，　it　is　only　by　th’枷60f　that　intrinsic　Analogy，　that　this
latter　Analogy（which　involves　the　logical　use　of　a　properly
univocal　term　after　the　manner　of　an　intrinsic　analogy）has　a
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place　in　metaphysical　demonstration　at　all，　Then，
far　as　to　say：
he　goes　so
Is　it　not　clear　that　this　concept　is　therefore　not　analogous
in　the　manner　of　a　concept　formally　univocal　which　can
be　applied　to　a　number　of　different　things？Is　it　not　clear
that　this　concept　is　therefore　not　analogous　by　Analogy　of
Attribution？For　it　is　simply　not　true　that“being”is
intrinsic　to　only　one　Analogate－the　Prime－and　is　then
transferred　to　the　other　Analogates　only　because　they　are
somehow　related　to　the　Prime．　To　understand　that　in
actual　fact　being　is　found　in　all　beings　is　merely　to　recognize
that　everything　that　is，　is！In　other　words，　the　over－all
Analogy　of　Being　in　its　actuality　contains　only　virtually
Analogy　of　Attribution　in　the　sense　that　it　has　the　m’rtue
or　power　of　producing　an　effect，　namely，　extrinsic　denomi
nation　from　One，　which　Analogy　of　Attribution　alone
produces　formally．78
　　　　　It　is　important　to　take　heed　here　that　Luther’snotion　of
deus　absconditus　is　intelligible　only　against　this　background．　As
the　entitative　nature　of　God，　the　deus　absconditus　orders　humans
to　live　according　to　the　principle　of　retributive　justice　（ius
talionis）．　But　if　we　lost　sight　of　the　proportionately－ontological
aspect，　while　over－emphasizing　the　unius　ad　alterum　aspect，　of
the　entitative　God，　we　would　be　terrified，　as　was　Luther，　by
the　thought　that　the　complete　fulfillment　of　retributive　justice
before　God（coram　Deo）is　impossible　for　humanity．　Yet，　we
would　be　right　in　part　in　this，　as　was　Luther，　for　retributive
justice　contains，　at　least　on　the　religious　level，　our　trustful
loyalty　to　God．　And，　from　the　perspective　of　loyalty，　we　need
the　help　of　the　power　of　loyalty　which　evokes　our　loyalty　to
God　in　spite　of　our　depravity．　This　power　we　can　find，　as
Luther’sdiscovery　of　the　new　righteousness　of　God（iustitia　Dei
nova）testifies，　in　Christ．　At　any　rate，　authentic　existence　in
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this　regard　is　one　which　is“10yal　or　dutiful”to　the　call　of　God．
4．　The」Fulfi〃〃zent　oア．∠監ゴ〃zs！　The　C1〃ゼs’0109諺’cα1　ReinterPtetation　oノ『the
、4nalogy　oア！lttri’bution　duorum　ad　tertium
　　　　　As　has　been　shown　in　Section　II，　Luther’sdoctrine　of
justification　and　prayer　satisfies　the　intent　of　the　analogy　of
attribution　duorum　ad　tertiu〃z　religiously．　That　is，　our　prayer
induces，　the　deus　revelatus　manifests，　and　the　deus　absconditus
enjoys，　justice．　This　is　mainly　because　Luther　has　elucidated
the　paradoxical　character　of　the　Christ　event：namely，　although，
ontologically，　God　is　everywhere，　God　is　nowhere　other　than　in
Christ　from　the　viewpoint　of　soteriology．　The　core　of　the
paradox　consists　in　the　fact　that　Christ　has　radically　fulfilled　the
inmost　requirement　of　retributive　justice（i．e．，　loyalty　to　God）
for　our　sake　on　the　cross，　thus　bringing　dramatically　into
existence　a　totally　new　righteousness　of　God：forgiveness　as　the
justice　by　virtue　of　which　God　makes　us　righteous伽stitia　Dei
quαnos　iustus　faciens）．　This　righteousness　of　God　is　in　itself
prayer　for　us（see　Sec．　II，　B）．As　such，　it　is　the　best　answer
to　the　Augustinian　prayer　which　Luther　shares：Dα（1％04　iubes
（Give　me　what　you　order）．
　　　　　This　does　not，　however，　mean　that　the　new　righteousness
of　God　is　the　character　restricted　to　the　deus　revelatus．　Rather，
it　exists　ontologically，　too，　as　what　Whitehead　calls　the　consequent
nature　of　God（i．e．，Hartshorne’sR）which　in　God　is　creatively
unified　with　the　primordial　nature（i．e．，｝lartshorne’sA），as　I
mentioned　earlier．　In　history　it　expresses　itself　eschatologically，
though．
　　　　　If　the　forgiveness　or　mercy　of　God　exists　ontologically　as
well，　then　nobody－－whether　Christian　or　non－Christian－－is
alienated　from　it．　Hence，　everyone’sdue（suum　cuique）is　taken
into　account　by　God　supremely　benevolently．　We　are　thus
encouraged　to　refer　back　to　retributive　justice　afresh－this　time
in　the　light　of　the　all－embracing　love　of　God．　In　this　light　it
becomes　important　once　again　to　render　to　everyone　his　or　her
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due　in　a　limited，　proportionate　way．　A　reevaluation　of　the
Thomist　Analogy　of　Being　is　thus　enabled　against　the　background
of　a　deepened　vision　of　Reformation　theology．　Then，　we　can
say：ultimately，　we　are“righteous”by　faith　alone，　by　the
all－embracing　love　of　God；and，　penultimately，　we　are“just”
proportionately－ontologically　according　to　the　principle　of
Analogia　Entis．
　　　　　Ihope　the　fourfold　portrayal　of‘‘authentic　existence”　I
have　thus　far　provided　by　a　study　of　the　problem　of　analogy
will　help　us　cherish　the　spirit　of　tolerance，　dialogue，　and
mutual　understanding　between　different　types　of　philosophy　of
religion，　such　as　Thomism，　Protestant　confessionalism，　Whiteheadian
process　thought，　and　the　Nishida　school　of　Buddhist　philosophy．
PORTRAYING“AUTHENTIC　EXISTENCE”17
NOTES：
68a．　See　my　critical　review　of　Saburo　Ichii’sVP7iitehead　mo　tetsugaku
　　　　（Whitehead’sPhilosophy），Proce∬Stznties，13／2，　Summer　1983，
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76a．　Why　I　say　I　refer　to　Whitehead’smaxim　transformatively　is
　　　that　he　conceives　of　the　primordial　nature　of　God　merely　generally
　　　in　terms　of“the　unlimited　conceptual　realization　of　the　absolute
　　　wealth　of　potentiality”（PR，343）without　reference　to　the　exact
　　　mode　in　which　God　is“with　us．”By　contrast，　I　clearly　locate
　　　the　co－existence　of　this　nature　of　God　at　the　point　of“real
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　potentiality－－namely，　the　dative　phase　of　the　novel　creation．
　　　Cf．　Lewis　S．　Ford，“Creativity　in　a　Future　Keym，”in／Vew
　　　Essays　inルfetaphysics，　ed．　Robert　C．　Neville（State　University　of
　　　New　York　Press，1987），p．185．
76b．　Paul　Ricoeur，7】肋Sy〃tholism　oアE兜’1，　trans．　Emerson　Buchanan
　　　（Boston：Beacon　Press，1967），pp．19，347－57．
77．　This　statement　represents　my　over－all　vision　of　systematic
　　　theology．　According　to　John　Macquarrie，　thcre　are　three　divisions
　　　in　systematic　theology：（1）philosophica1（or　natural）theology；
　　　（2）symbolical（or　revealed）theology；and（3）applied　theology
　　　（see　his　Principles　oプα〃ristian　Theology，　Revised　Edition［London：
　　　SCM　Press　Ltd．，1966，1977］，　pp．39－40）．　As　has　been　elucidated
　　　in　the　text，　my　understanding　of　the　three　divisions　of　systematic
　　　theology　is　processive　and　dialectical，　not　simply　typologicaL　As
　　　aresult，　the　third　division　is　synthetic　and　inclusive　as　well　as
　　　applied　in　nature．　And　this　mens　that　natural　theology，　although
　　　it　is　once　radically　negated　by　the　revealed　theology　of　Protestantism，
　　　is　re－vitalized　on　the　condition　that　it　now　is　guided　by　the
　　　revelationist－rationalist　principle－the　topological　re－interpretation
　　　of　the　analogy　of　attribution　duont〃2　ad．　te7tiu〃z　as　it　is　inclusive
　　　of　both　Thomism　and　Reformation　theology，　as　shall　be　clarified
　　　in　the　text．
　　　　　　　　　Traditional　type　natural　theology　is　concerned　with　the
　　　knowledge　of　God（Le．，the　existence　and　the　benovolent
　　　nature　of　the　Deity）by　rational　means　alone．　Because　it　needs
　　　the　Christian　revelation　for　the　completion　of　the　knowledge　of
　　　God（specifically　as“triune”），it　is　in　essence，　as　William
　　　Temple　critically　designates，“the　philosophical　introduction　to
　　　Religion”but　not　Religion　itself（ハJature，ルlan，　am！Gα！［London：
　　　Macmillan　Company］，1956，　p．10）．　However，　a　renewed
　　　fashion　of　natural　theology　deals　with　the　same　content　of
　　　Religion　as　does　revealed　theology－－but　by　the　philosophical
　　　method，　hence，　with　no　claim　to　authority　of　the　community　of
　　　faith（see　Temple，　oP．cit．．，P．7；see　also　John　B．　Cobb，　Jr．，
　　　．4Christian　Natural　Theology　：Based伽the　Thought　oアAlfred　N（nth
　　　陥惚伽4［Philadelphia：Westminster　Press，1965］，　pp．266－67），
　　　　　　　　It　is　within　the　context　of　the　need　for　the　re－vitalization
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78．
of　Natural　Theology　as　Applied　Theology　that　I　regard　David
Tracy　as　basically　right　when　he　says　as　follows：‘‘For　all　those
who　cannot　share　either　the　easy　answer　of　a　relaxed　pluralism
or　the　hard　answer　of　a　brittle　univocity，　the　reality　of　an
analogical　imagination　becomes　a　live　option　in　our　day”（see
his　The　／1malo8i’6α11〃zagimation　：Christianηz召o’ogy　and　the　Cu〃ure　o∫
Plura〃sm［New　York；Crossroad，1981］，　p．451）．　Then，　the
analogical　imagination　which　my　vision　of　the　task　of　systematic
theology　for　today　cherishes　can　be　represented　by　the　following
passage　from　John　Ruskin’sModern　Painters：“So，　then，　we
have　the　three　ranks：the　man　who　perceives　rightly，　because
he　does　not　feel，　and　to　whom　the　primrose　is　accurately　the
primrose，　because　he　does　not　love　it．　Then，　secondly，　the
man　who　perceives　wrongly，　because　he　feels，　and　to　whom　the
primrose　is　anything　else　than　a　primrose：astar，　or　a　sun，　or
afairy’sshield，　or　a　forsaken　maiden．　And　then，　lastly，　there
is　the　man　who　perceives　rightly　in　spite　of　his　feelings，　and　to
whom　the　primrose　is　for　ever　nothing　else　than　itself－a　little
flower，　apprehended　in　the　very　plain　and　leafy　fact　of　it，
whatever　and　how　many　soever　the　associations　and　passions
may　be　that　crowd　around　it”（Vol．3，1859，　pp．162－63）．In
my　new　paradigm　of　systematic　theology，　rationalism　and
symbolism　can　both　be　satisfied．
　　　Anderson，1～eflection　on　the．肋alogy　o∫Being，　p．29；cf．
Phelan，　St．　Thomas　and／lmalog：ソ，　pp．37－38．
